Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium on Professional
Negligence

Article 3

6-1959

Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability
John G. Fleming

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
John G. Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 633
(1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/3

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENGLISH LAW
OF MEDICAL LIABILITY
JOHN G. FLEMING*
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the common law world, as indeed elsewhere, our generation has been witness to an unmistakable, if not always consistent,

trend of increasingly disassociating the administration of accident law
from the philosophy of individual fault in favor of the collectivist

principle of loss distribution, as evidenced in the movement towards
stricter liability in litigation areas with a background of liability in-

surance. However debatable the measure of this reorientation in the
United States,' it has taken very large strides in the several jurisdic-

tions of the British Commonwealth where a pattern of loss allocation is
now visibly emerging which, in many respects, bears but scant re-

semblance to the law of torts administered in the earlier decades of this

century. 2 This transformation has been particularly evident in the

socially and statistically most vital fields of automobile and industrial
accidents. Statutory abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine,3 the

virtual atrophy of the defense of voluntary assumption of risk,4 intro-

duction of comparative negligence and apportionment of loss in cases
of contributory negligence, 5 proliferation of industrial safety statutes

opening a wide avenue for recovery against employers on the footing

of negligence per se,6 and the active collaboration by courts and juries,
" Professor of Law and Department Head, Canberra University, Australia.
1. See especially EHRENZwEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS, passim (1956); and the forceful protest by Cooperrider, A
Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1958).
2. See FLEMING, TORTS, passim (1957).
3. Pioneered by New Zealand in 1908, this measure was adopted in England
in 1948 and is standard legislation throughout Australia and New Zealand.
4. The defense has completely disappeared from the sphere of employment
relations (on the ground of lack of freedom of choice) and, under the influence of apportionment legislation, seems destined to wither away even in
such areas as guest passenger-drunken driver cases where the tendency is to

construe consenting conduct as contributory negligence. This has the effect

of merely reducing, instead of barring, recovery. See Car & General Insurance
v. Seymour [1956] 2 D.L.R.2d 369, Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 K.B. 509 (1938).
A similar tendency of giving the fullest effect to the legislative intent underlying comparative negligence statutes is found in Nebraska. See Note, Assumption of Risk as a Defense in Nebraska, 30 NEB. L. REV. 608 (1951), though not
in Mississippi or Wisconsin.
5. Adopted in England in 1945 (in a much improved form) from earlier

Canadian experiments, and accepted in the following years by all Australian

jurisdictions (except New South Wales) and New Zealand. See generally
PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1-69 (1954).
6. According to a recent estimate in New South Wales, over 25% of all

actions against employers are of this nature. In that state, since 1945, contribu-

tory negligence is no longer a defense to actions based on breach of statute,
and elsewhere the standard of care expected from plaintiff employees is very
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under the overshadowing influence of compulsory insurance, 7 in postulating at once the most exacting standard of conduct for defendants
and the least for plaintiffs 8 -these are some of the salient landmarks
in the current process of eroding the fault dogma and replacing it by
a new system of loss distribution aimed at accommodating the midcentury quest for social security within a still predominantly free
enterprise economy.
In notable contrast, the law of professional liability has maintained
a steadfast immunity to similar encroachments and remains, in British
no less than American jurisdictions, a refuge amidst the alien corn, in
which conventional notions of fault within the orthodox framework of
negligence continue to display their untarnished bloom. The reason for
this disparity is not far to seek, for, despite almost universal liability
insurance, the courts are as ever alive to the weighty repercussions of
adverse verdicts on the reputation and future of professional defendants, and have shown little inclination to condone attenuations of the
fault requirement, however tempting the analogy with enterprise
liability in the business world. Manifestly, liability insurance in this
area fails to eliminate the punitive sanction of an adverse judgment,
because it cannot afford protection against inevitable damage to professional standing. In consequence, the law of negligence still performs
in this context the task of controlling conduct and cannot afford to
yield readily to pressures which, elsewhere, have led to a decline of
moral fault as a significant determinant of liability.
Among the various professional groups, medical men seem to be the
most frequent target of tort litigation, and medical malpractice actions
furnish a microcosm of prevailing community and courtroom attitudes
towards the problem of professional liability. Since the end of the war,
there has been a noticeable increase in the volume of such actions in
England, 9 though it has not nearly attained the proportions endemic
much attenuated since Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Assoc. Collieries Ltd. [1940]
A.C. 152. In this connection, it is to be noted that, in contrast to America,
English and Australian jurisdictions permit an injured workman the choice
between claiming workmen's compensation and proceeding against his
employer for common law negligence or breach of statutory duty.
7. In the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand liability insurance
against the risk of personal injury and death is compulsory for all owners
of automobiles. Insurance cover must be unlimited. As regards industrial
accidents, insurance by employers against common law liability is still voluntary (though well-nigh universal), except in New South Wales where cover
for £20,000 is obligatory. Insurance against workmen's compensation is, of
course, compulsory everywhere.
8. This dual standard enjoys official endorsement with respect to actions
against employers, as graphically illustrated in Staveley Iron Co. Ltd. v. Jones
[1956] A.C. 627. In traffic accident cases, a not dissimilar result is attained
regardless of book theory. In British jurisdictions, courts and juries have
shown no inclination to be deterred from this course by the argument, so
familiar to Americans, that this will inevitably raise the cost of insurance
and therefore affect their own pocket book.
9. No parallel development has been observed in Australia where the first
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in the United States. Such increase as has taken place seems to be
attributable to a variety of factors. 0 Perhaps foremost among these is
the advent of the National Health Service which has enormously increased the medical clientele, weakened the spirit of "voluntaryism"
and incidentally encouraged a popular attitude of looking on state run
hospitals as impersonal institutions endowed with a bottomless purse.
A second factor is the introduction, in 1949, of a legal aid and advice
scheme, providing public funds for the subvention of legal claims by
indigent suitors, many of which would formerly not have been pursued
for lack of means.' Finally, a new avenue for redress was opened as
the result of decisions holding hospitals responsible for the negligence
of their professional staff. A brief comment upon this development
would seem appropriate.
LiABILITY oF HosPITALS
Although English courts have categorically refused to endow charities with an exemption from the ordinary incidence of tort liability, 2
(apart from the brief flirtation in the mid-nineteenth century 13 which
fathered the American immunity doctrine 14) it was the generally
accepted rule until 1942 that a hospital was not responsible for any
negligence of its staff in the performance of their professional, as
distinct from purely administrative, duties.
Reminiscent of the New,York doctrine, 5 discarded only two years
ago, 16 this conclusion was defended on the ground that, with respect
to the former, there existed no master-servant relationship sufficient
to attract vicarious liability, as staff members were not subject to
orders or detailed control in the performance of their professional
functions, and because a hospital discharged its personal duty to a
patient by merely offering the services of a competent and carefully
two of the below mentioned causes are inapplicable. The slight post-war increase in claims little more than reflects a corresponding population growth
(statistical data are non-existent, but this information has been furnished by
the N.S.W. Medical Defence Union and undoubtedly reflects the position in
the whole of Australia).
10. See the brief discussion in an informative note, 166 J. Am. MED. ASSN.
2192 (1958).
11. This is of singular importance because of the inhibition against contingent fees.
12. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs [1866] Law Rep. H.L. 93.
13. Duncan v. Findlater [1839] 6 Cl. & F. 894; Feofees of Heriot's Hospital v.
Ross [1846] 12 C1. & F. 507; Holliday v. St. Leonard, Shoreditch [1861] 11 C.B.
(N.S.) 192.
14. The role of wet-nurse fell to the Massachusetts court in McDonald v.
Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876). See generally PROSSER, TORTS
784-88 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1667-75 (1956); and the annotations in 133 A.L.R. 821 (1941) and 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).

15. Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925); 42
A.L.R. 955 (1926).
16. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); and see Comment, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1314 (1957).
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selected medical staff.'7 But, commencing with a decision of the Court
of Appeal in 1942,18 a substantial reassessment of hospital liability was
initiated which, by progressive steps over the following fifteen years,
has culminated in the complete elimination of the former immunity.
This development was undoubtedly motivated by a growing conviction,
not without parallel in the United States,19 that the charitable nature
of hospitals was not really a sufficient reason for withholding redress
from injured patients and that, in any event, municipal or state
financed hospitals did not need the protection, however disguised, that
was once thought desirable in the interest of privately supported institutions. Indeed, in a notable departure from the British judicial tradition of suppressing "non-legal" factors bearing on the judging process,
Denning L. J. has frankly attributed this accelerated reorientation
to the nationalization of hospitals in the United Kingdom which accompanied the introduction of "socialized medicine" in 1948.20 In consequence, hospitals have been successively held liable for the negligence of nurses,21 resident medical officers, 22 house surgeons,23 radiographers,2 and even part-time anesthetists.2
The theoretical explanations accompanying this change are of more
than passing interest. In the first place, regarding the conventional
approach via the route of vicarious liability, the fact that professional
staff are substantially free from detailed control in their work is,
quite generally, no longer seen as an obstacle to making the employer
answerable for their shortcomings. The time honoured formula of
identifying an individual as a servant, only if he was subject to the
command of his master as to the manner of doing his work, has increasingly given way to the question, more nearly in accord with
17. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820; StrangwaysLesmere v. Clayton [1936] 2 K.B. 11; Dryden v. Surrey County Council [1936]
2 All E.R. 535.
18. Gold v. Essex County Council [1942] 2 K.B. 293. The change was foreshadowed in Logan v. Waitaki Hospital Board [1935] N.Z.L.R. 385, where the
New Zealand Court of Appeal, by a majority, held a hospital liable for the
culpable inattention of a nurse administering heat treatment. It rejected
the distinction between ministerial and professional tasks and distinguished
Hillyer's Case on the ground that, while in the operating theater, a nurse came
under the control of the surgeon, and during that time her employer's responsibility was suspended.
19. See, e.g., Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d.
162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953). Significantly, there is now perhaps a slight preponderance of American jurisdictions rejecting the immunity doctrine, and
there would be more but for the strangle hold of precedent. See McDermott
v. St. Mary's Hospital, 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.2d 608 (1957).
20. Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 361; See also his
remarks in THE CHANGING LAW 29 (1953).

21. Sisters of St. Joseph v. Fleming [1938] 2 D.L.R. 417; Henson v. Perth
Hospital [1939] 41 W. Austl. L.R. 15.
22. Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343.
23. Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council [1947] K.B. 598.
24. Gold v. Essex County Council [1942] 2 K.B. 293.
25. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66 (1953).
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modern economic and social realities, whether he was part of his
employer's organization. Was his work subject to co-ordinational control as to the "where" and "when," rather than the "how"? 26 Accordingly, a hospital can no longer plead in exoneration that its professional staff are free from detailed supervision in the performance of
their tasks, so long as they are part of the hospital organization and
27
not employed by the patient himself.
Even more significant has been the increasing support for a radically
new approach to the present problem which renders the distinction
between servants and independent contractors irrelevant in these
cases. According to this view,28 just as the assumption of responsibility
by a doctor for the care of a patient imposes upon him a personal duty
of care, regardless of whether he acts gratuitously or for reward, so
by receiving a patient for treatment a hospital undertakes a personal
duty of care towards him. True it is that a hospital can only act
through the instrumentality of servants and agents, to whom it must
delegate the actual performance of its obligations to the patient, but
these obligations are nonetheless personal and any failure to meet
them constitutes a breach of duty on its part. While the exact extent
of that duty may, theoretically, be a question of fact in each particular
case, having regard to the status of the hospital, the nature of the
arrangement it makes for the provision of staff and the relationship
between it and the patient, in actual practice the courts seem to be
postulating a uniform duty of care in respect of all treatment and
services provided by the staff whom the hospital has selected, employed and paid.2 9
From a functional point of view it seems to matter nothing which of
these two competing theories is preferred, as both yield the same
conclusions, except perhaps in the case of "visiting" specialists or
consultants. If the liability of hospitals is viewed as purely vicarious,
an argument for exempting hospitals from responsibility for the
negligence of the latter group would not be lacking in force, because
they might well be deemed to fall within the category of independent
contractors, even conceding that a part-time appointment is not necessarily incompatible with a relationship of controlled employment. But
the alternative theory decisively compels the contrary conclusion, because it would be difficult to deny that the hospital's obligation extends
26.

See

14 MODERN L. REv. 504 (1951); FLEMING, TORTS 358-61 (1957).

27. As was the case in Crits v. Sylvester [1956] 1 D.L.R. 2d

502 and appar-

ently in Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820.
28. Originating in Lord Greene's opinion in Gold's Case, it was adopted and
elaborated by Denning L.J. in Cassidy and Roe (where it was also endorsed
by Morris L.J.) For further support see Macdonald v. Glasgow Corporation,
[1954] S.C. 453 and NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 122-48 (1957).
29. See NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 112-48 (1957); Grunfeld, Recent Developments in the Hospital Cases, 17 MODERN L. REv. 547 (1954).
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to treating the patient by the hands of any staff made available and
comprised in its organization. Although the issue still awaits authoritative determination, the scales seem to be tipping in favour of the
wider liability.30
The practical effect of the development just described reaches even
beyond its immediately apparent implications. For, by unlocking the
door which had previously screened hospitals from liability, it has
also generated a changing attitude by the public towards seeking
redress for real or fancied medical mistreatment. As modern hospitals
have grown in size, and indeed in efficiency, so it has become comparatively harder for them to maintain the human and personal relationship which has always been a characteristic feature of the traditional
relation between doctor and patient. That intimacy has undoubtedly
been a major factor in discouraging resort to legal redress against the
private physician, if by chance some harm or disappointing result has
followed medical and surgical treatment. By contrast, the impersonal
aspect of large modern hospitals, often coupled with an undeveloped
sense for public relations, has led to a disappearance of that safety
valve. If anything goes wrong, the hospital patient no longer has any
thought of linking it with a particular surgeon, anesthetist, radiologist,
nurse or pharmacist; rather he regards it in terms of a corporate defect
affecting the institution as a whole. 3' In consequence, and not uninfluenced by the fact that hospitals are today usually state supported
institutions and therefore backed by unlimited public funds, the
aggrieved patient is more inclined, if not encouraged, to sample his
chances of financial gain in the courts. The result, as already pointed
out, has been a sharp increase in the volume of malpractice actions,
especially in England, foreshadowing perhaps a growing gulf between
the positions of hospitals and individual medical practitioners as
regards their exposure to suit.
Before leaving the subject of hospitals' liability, mention may conveniently be made of an interesting recent decision dealing with the
allocation of loss, for negligent injury to a patient, as between a culpable intern and the hospital employing him. In the case in question, 32
a young physician, recently qualified, under orders from a house surgeon in charge of the operation, commenced to anesthetize a patient
with gas, but when this method was found impracticable, administered
a full dose of pentothal. Owing to the fact that the patient was already
30. Such older decisions as Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909]
2 K.B. 820 and Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council [1947] K.B. 598 are
no longer safe guides since Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343.
The question was left open by Somervell and Morris L.J. in Roe v. Ministry of
Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 80, 90, but Denning L.J. reiterated his view, already
expressed in Cassidy, in favour of liability.
31. See Lynch, The Hospital, The Public and the Law, 30 N.Z.L.J. 118 (1954).

32. Jones v. Manchester Corporation [1952] 2 Q.B. 852.
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partially drugged and the injection, apart from being too large in quantity, was also too quickly administered, the patient collapsed and
died. His widow having recovered judgment against the intern and
the hospital, the latter made a claim for contribution or an indemnity
but, significantly, responsibility was apportioned against it in the ratio
of 80:20. Although it is now decisively settled that an employer is
ordinarily entitled, whether contractually or by virtue of tortfeasors'
legislation,33 to a full indemnity from a servant whose default has
involved him in vicarious liability, 31 such course did not seem "just
and equitable" where the employer was himself personally negligent
or the accident was contributed to by some other servant of his. Here
a much more serious view was taken of the hospital's dereliction of
duty in comparison with the error of the neophyte. The hospital was
doubly responsible for the accident, being not only vicariously liable
for the negligence of the surgeon in charge, but most of all for its
"personal" failure so to run its organization that such mistakes would
not occur. This emphasis on hospitals' organizational responsibility
clearly reflects the long road our courts have travelled since the time,
not in the distant past, when they were merely thought of as providing
facilities where patients could meet professional men with a view
to treatment.
It remains to add that in the present case the contest was of course
in reality between two insurance companies, as both the nominal
parties would have beei insured against the consequences of negligence; for otherwise it is still as rare as it would be undesirable to find
employers demanding their pound of flesh from a more vulnerable
employee and thereby blocking the "conduit" for distributing the loss
more widely or counting it as an overhead of the enterprise. 35 In order
33. Under standard legislation, almost uniformly adopted through the
Commonwealth, provision is made for the recovery of contribution or indemnity from a cotortfeasor in accordance with what a court finds "just and
equitable having regard to (the latter's) responsibility for the damage." See
generally WILLIAmS, JOINT ToRTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1951).
34. Lister v. Romford Ice Co. [1957] A.C. 555 (1956); Davenport v. Commis-

sioner for Railways 53 S.R. (N.S.W.) 552 (1953); Semtex, Ltd. v. Gladstone
[1954] 2 All E.R. 206.
35. While it is conceded that the threat of demanding an indemnity is a
useful deterrent against highhanded conduct by employees, and resort to it
fully justified in such cases, see e.g., Ryan v. Fildes [1938] 3 All E.R. 517,
Finnegan v. Riley [1939] 4 D.L.R. 434 and Davenport's Case supra, there is no
merit in invoking similar reprisals in cases of accidental harm. Nonetheless,
by a narrow majority of 3 to 2, the House of Lords recently held that such
loss-shifting cannot be resisted even where the employer was insured against
the risk and the employee understood that he was to be protected against the
hazard of personal liability. Lister v. Romford Ice Co. [1957] A.C. 555. This
enabled an insurance company to appropriate the employer's indemnity against
the latter's declared wishes, and thereby to evade its proper function of
spreading the risk and to pocket the premiums which were undoubtedly fixed
without any thought of recoupment from the servant. In a recent survey of
this decision, an Inter-Departmental Committee in England concluded: "The
decision in Lister's case shows that employers and their insurers have rights
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to obviate the unsavory spectacle of a hospital seeking to pin the
blame for a particular accident exclusively on one of its professional
employees, with the latter retaliating in kind, an arrangement has
since been recommended by the Ministry of Health which will avoid
public contests of this kind by stipulating in advance of the trial in
what proportion responsibility shall be borne in the event of an
36
adverse verdict.
STANDARD OF PROFESSIONAL SKILL AND CARE

American courts have been singularly tender to the interests of
medical defendants, in an endeavour to safeguard public confidence
in the profession and shield it against blackmailing tactics of disgruntled patients to which it is so peculiarly vulnerable. Chief among
the legal "hedging" devices designed to advance this policy are the
requirements that the particular physician must be shown to have
departed from the common standard of skill and care exercised by
practitioners in his or a similar community, 37 that such departure must
be proved by expert testimony except in the rare case where the negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman may readily recognize it
without such assistance,33 and by the widespread rule of practice postulating a more convincing prima facie case than is ordinarily de39
manded.
None of these privileges have found unqualified acceptance in British
practice. This contrast may be due partly t6 lesser pressure for techniques calculated to protect professional men against spurious claims,
partly to the widespread disappearance of jury trial which has largely
eliminated the need for procedural and evidentiary rules intended to
counteract the tendency of juries to ignore the larger issues in their
understandable preoccupation with an individual plaintiff's misfortunes. 40 Not surprisingly, British courts have refused to countenance
against employees which, if exploited unreasonably, would endanger good
industrial relations. We think the employers and insurers, if only in their own
interests, will not so exploit their right.... We do not think, therefore, that

the decision has exposed a practical problem that there is any need for legislation at present.... Our conclusion does not, however rule out any further
effort to deal with the matter by voluntary methods, such as an extension of
the 'gentlemen's agreement' within the insurance field, or by collective bargaining in any individual industry." Ministry of Labour and National Service,
H.M.S.O., 1959.

36. Ministry of Health Circular H.M.(54) 32, embodying an arrangement
between the Ministry, on the one hand, and the Medical Defence Union, the
Medical Protection Society of England and Wales and the Medical and Dental
Defence Union of Scotland, on the other. One of its incidental effects is to
provide an additional incentive to medical staff insuring themselves against
common law liability.

37. See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (1942).
38. See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2090 (3d ed. 1940).

39. See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
40. But even in those Commonwealth jurisdictions where jury trial still
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the "community" test applied throughout the United States (with the
exception of California and Minnesota).41 That rule, which is plainly
designed for the relief of country practitioners, has long been an
anachronism even in the American context. Modern means of communication have largely destroyed the validity of the argument that
rural doctors stand in need of compensation for their comparative isolation and inability to keep abreast of scientific progress, and it is in
any event a matter for grave reflection whether the law should lightly
abandon its role of activating constant improvement of professional
standards. While it is certainly true that a small and compact country
like the United Kingdom encounters fewer obstacles to the setting of
uniform and national standards, it is nonetheless significant that the
American practice has been equally rejected in the Dominions where
social conditions bear a strong resemblance to those prevailing in the
United States.4
What of the crystallized American rule that, in malpractice actions,
adherence to custom is conclusive proof of absence of negligence? In
relation to other professional groups, there exists a well settled
reservation that conformity to a common practice does not preclude a
finding of negligence if that practice fails to make due provision for
obvious risks, as otherwise a profession could set its own uncontrolled
standards to the detriment of public safety.43 It is extremely doubtful
if British courts would be prepared to compromise this stand in favour
of medical practitioners, though admittedly authority is scant.4 4 The
issue has rarely, if ever, arisen in that stark form, especially as the
absence of jury trial has tended to obscure the distinction between
what evidence is necessary to establish a prima facie case and what
justifies a finding for the defendant. There are a few isolated cases in
which conformity to custom has not precluded a judgment for the
prevails, as in New South Wales (Australia), there has been no suggestion of

tightening jury controls in malpractice actions. A revealing story is told by

the protracted litigation in the celebrated case of Hocking v. Bell (1947)
75 C.L.R. 125, which involved no less than four consecutive jury trials. The
first, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, was set aside as being against the
weight of evidence; at the second and third trials the jury disagreed; but the
fourth, resulting in another verdict for the plaintiff, was finally allowed to
stand by the Privy Council, reversing an order for yet another new trial by
the Full Court of New South Wales and the High Court of Australia.
41. See NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE, 21-22 (1957)'.
42. See Van Wuk v. Lewis [1924] App. Div. 438, 444, per Innes C.J. (South
Africa).
43. See, e.g., Lord Wright in Lloyds Bank v. Savory & Co. [1933] A.C. 201,

232 (1932): "It is argued that this is not the ordinary practice of bankers, and
that a bank is not negligent if it takes all precautions usually taken by bankers.
I do not accept that latter proposition as true in cases where the ordinary
practice of bankers fails in making due provision for a risk fully known to
those experienced in the business of banking."
44. See the critical view of the American practice by Montrose, 21 MoD. L.
REV. 259 (1958).
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plaintiff, 45 but these were of a kind where even American courts occasionally relax the principal rule, as in cases involving sponge counts
where expert testimony may be dispensed with.46 In a recent English
decision of first impression, significantly involving a jury trial, the
court gave the instruction that a doctor can acquit himself by conforming to practices accepted as proper by a responsible section of his
profession and cannot be held liable merely because there is a body of
opinion which takes a contrary view.47 This ruling does not, of course,
imply that conformity is necessarily conclusive, but suggests that it
will be accepted as such, unless the practice is demonstrably fraught
with obvious hazards.
Occasional complaints voiced in medical circles, that the standard
of skill and care postulated by the courts is tending to increasing
stringency, appear unfounded. Indicative of the prevailing approach
is the recent expression of policy by Denning L.J. that:
[W]e should be doing a disservice to the community at large if we were
to impose liability on hospitals and doctors for everything that happens
to go wrong. Doctors would be led to think more of their own safety than
the good of their patients. Initiative would be stifled and confidence shaken.
A proper sense of proportion requires us to have regard to the conditions
in which hospitals and doctors work. We must insist on due care for the
patient at every point, but we must not condemn as negligence that which
is only a misadventure.4 8
As an illustration may be cited one fairly recent case 49 where paralysis
following a spinal injection was traced to the cause that the ampoules
containing nupercaine had been stored in phenol which percolated
through molecular flaws in the glass and contaminated the anesthetic.
Despite evidence that two American medical publications had within
the preceding twelve months drawn attention to this danger, the
defendant was exonerated, because that literature was outside "the
range of the ordinary anesthetist" in England at the time, and he
could not be convicted of negligence for failing to adopt a technique
(of using a colouring agent) that might have disclosed the presence
of a risk which he, in common with other competent men in his field,
did not appreciate as a possibility.
45. E.g., Anderson v. Chasney [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223.
46. According to a dominant view, the expert testimony and "community
test" rules usually march together: See Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 442, 164
N.E. 518 (1928).
47. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Committee [1957] 2 All E.R. 118.
48. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 86-7 (1953). Although to
instruct a jury in terms of "gross negligence" is reversible error, that phrase
nevertheless does suggest what in practice is fairly close to the truth, viz. that,
in order to convict a medical practitioner there must be so marked a departure
from the normal standard of professional conduct as to infer a lack of care
which a man of ordinary skill would display; See Hunter v. Hanley [1955] S.C.
200, 206, per Lord Clyde.
49. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66 (1953).
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On an occasion such as this, limitations of space preclude a detailed
review of the case law dealing with particular aspects of the degree
of skill and care that is expected from practitioners in their daily
routine of diagnosis and treatment.50 Suffice it here to draw attention
to one recent New Zealand decision which is as novel as it seems destined for controversy. In Furniss v. Fitchett,51 the plaintiff was a
married woman who, with her husband, had been a regular patient of
the defendant. Prone to mental instability, she precipitated domestic
discord by groundless allegations of violence and cruelty against her
husband. On one occasion, the latter called on the defendant and requested a report on his wife's condition for the use of his lawyer. The
doctor issued him a certificate in which he accurately stated that the
plaintiff showed symptoms of paranoia and advised psychiatric treatment. Some twelve months later, in connection with an application by
the wife for separate maintenance, the husband's lawyer in crossexamination produced the medical report of which she had hitherto
been ignorant, and the unexpected disclosure caused her shock. In
the present proceedings, framed in tort, she sought damages against
the doctor for actionable negligence, and succeeded in recovering a
substantial verdict. According to the Chief Justice who presided at
the trial with a jury,

[A] doctor's duty of care to his patient involves a duty not to give to a
third party a certificate as to his patient's condition if he can reasonably
foresee that the certificate might come to the patient's knowledge and if
he can reasonably foresee that he would be likely to cause his patient
physical harm.52
This proposition will not only be regarded with dismay by the medical profession, but seems to be no less startling to the lawyer. While
it may be conceded as an almost universal postulate of our time that
an individual is placed under a duty of care so to conduct his activities
as not to inflict physical injury on others whom he ought reasonably to
contemplate as being within the area of foreseeable risk, there exist
several well established qualifications, no less valid in British than
American law, which on various grounds of competing policy demand
a more cautious approach in certain defined situations. Relevant in
the present context are, at least, two such "riders." In the first place,
there has been a persistent hesitation to accept the broad criterion of
foreseeability as an exhaustive measure of liability in cases involving
shock, as distinct from external physical injury. Admittedly, our
courts long ago passed the point of requiring actual physical impact
50. A valuable analysis of British law is to be found in NATHAN, 1MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE 41-103 (1957).
51. [1958] N.Z.L.R. 398.
52. Id. at 405.
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as a condition of recovery, 3 and have hitherto failed to commirth~mselves to any definitive test for qualifying liability%':''but th6 trend
of modern decisions in this area leaves little doubt-of.t continuing
determination to permit recovery in only limited citcamstances, as
where the plaintiff was himself within the area of physical impact.55
Certainly, the cavalier treatment of this controversial issue -in the
judgment under review ill consorts with the recent refusal, by the
English Court of Appeal, to permit recovery to a mother who had
sustained severe shock as the result of witnessing her child being
crushed by a careless driver in the street below.5 6
Of even greater interest is the equivalence accorded by the instant
opinion to negligence in "act" and negligence in "word." As is well
known, the common law has been traditionally chary of postulating
a duty of care regarding what a man says, in distinction to what he
does, even if in the circumstances lack of reasonable diligence may
foreseeably expose others to an unreasonable risk of injury. English
courts have shown themselves specially sensitive to this distinction,
and only a few years ago reiterated, in the widest terms, their refusal
to countenance any' liability in damages for negligent misrepresentation, when in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.,5 7 it was held that
accountants were not liable, at the suit of an investor, for misleading
information contained in a corporate balance sheet, even though they
were specifically informed that it was required fbr the guidance of
the plaintiff in the very transaction in question. 58 This uncompromising stand for the proposition that, in the use of words, there was
merely a duty of honesty but not of care, is of far reaching import for
the whole field of professional liability, and hardly lessened by suggestions that this broad exemption from the incidence of liability for
negligence applied no less to cases of consequential physical injury
than to purely economic loss. 59 Such generalities should, of course,
53. Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
54. See FLEWING, ToRTs 169-76 (1957).

55. Note particularly the leading decision of Bourhill v. Young [1943] A.C.

92 (1942).

56. King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, which is of course, parallel with the
leading American decision of Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935). For criticism see Goodhart, Emotional Shock and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L.Q. REV. 347 (1953); and the Shock Cases and the
Area of Risk, 16 MoD. L. REV. 14 (1953).
57. [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (1950).
58. For ttfs reason, the fact situation bore greater resemblance to Glanzer
v. Shepard 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) than Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), on which the Court of Appeal erroneously
relied for its view of American law. See further, Seavey, Negligent Misrepresentation of Accountants, 67 L.Q. REV. 466 (1951).
59. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 194 (1950), where
Asquith L.J. doubted whether a marine hydrographer would be liable for
carelessly omitting to mark a reef on his map as a result of which a liner is
wrecked.
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be trea ted with. caution, and are plainly opposed to a substantial body
of .precedent which has consistently sanctioned liability for negligent
misrepresentations resulting in physical injury.60 The claim to personal security, has always evoked a stronger protective response in
the law of torts than the interest in economic integrity, and been less
apt to raise the specter of exposing individuals to an excessive burden
of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class." 61 Certainly, it has never been seriously questioned that a physician, whether acting gratuitously or for reward, is
under the same legal obligation toward a patient to exercise professional skill and care as regards medical advice and prescription of
medicines as in relation to physical treatment, such as surgery.6 2
Perhaps the most promising feature of the decision under review is its
sign that the peculiar tenderness shown to professional purveyors of
information may, after all, be warranted only in the context of claims
for pecuniary loss, but not in actions based on physical injury (including severe emotional disturbance).
The preceding comment, however, does not dispose of all the difficulties posed by Furniss v. Fitchett. Almost all the case law dealing
with liability for negligent statements has hitherto been concerned
with misrepr.esentations,whereas the present raises the novel point of
foreseeable harm resulting from a perfectly accurate certificate. If
anything, that difference would seem to weight the scales more
heavily against, rather than for, liability, especially as past experience
in the closely related context of actions for "causing mental disturbance" suggests the strongest hesitation to extend redress beyond the
point where the defendant has been guilty of intentional or, at least,
reckless misconduct. 63 To many minds, then, the decision would seem
to open dangerously wide doors. 64 If the mere possibility of a patient
suffering distress (or injury?) as the result of becoming aware of a
diagnosis were sufficient to put the doctor under a duty of silence,
he would be just as much precluded from telling the patient directly
as he is apparently enjoined from doing indirectly through a close
relative. 65 If it be answered that the present case was peculiar in as
60. See FLEMING, TORTS, 185-90 (1957); Morison, Liability in Negligence for
False Statements, 67 L.Q. REV. 212 (1951).
61. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931), per Cardozo, J.
62. Banbury v. Bank of Montreal [1918] A.C. 626, 657, 689.
.1
63. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956) ;iforeshadowing the new formulation of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, § 46 (Tenn. Draft
No. 1, 1957).
64. See the adverse criticism by A. G. Davies, 21 MOD. L. REV. 438 (1958),
and the editorial note in 32 AUSTL. L.J. 301 (1959).
65. Thus, at one point, the opinion blandly states that "the doctor owed to
his patient at common law a duty to take reasonable care to insure that no
expression of his opinion as to her mental condition should come to her knowledge" [1958] N.Z.L.R. 398, at 404.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

much as the physician was aware of existing marital discord, was
there really sufficient evidence to burden him with prescience that
the certificate would be used so as to embarrass and subject her to
public indignity?6 6 Indeed, is there not now a prospect of a doctor
becoming liable for wrongful death, if he discloses to a husband that
his wife is suffering cancer and the latter commits suicide on hearing
the news as the result of some indiscretion? 67 Such speculation opens
up startling vistas of novel liability, and supports the expectation
that the opinion under review will not be accepted as the last word
on the present subject.
THE YBARRA V. SPANGARD SYNDROME

Medical malpractice actions are singularly beset with problems of
proof. One of the most critical issues of this order confronting the trial
lawyer arises from the frequent difficulty of pinning the blame on a
responsible party in cases where the patient has sustained injury in
an operating theatre at the hands of some one of the surgical team.
It is, of course, generally accepted as axiomatic in a society dedicated
to the values of individualism, that no person shall be made to answer
for an event, unless his responsibility for it has been convincingly
proved by due process of law. In particular, the notion of collective
guilt is rejected by us as an odious excrescence of fascist and communist ideology, alien to the very tenets of Western civilization and
especially incompatible with an administration of justice operating
within a pattern of negligence or "fault" liability. This premise is
exposed to severe strain in situations where the plaintiff has suffered
injury through the admitted negligence of one or more individuals,
but he cannot say which one, and all the potential defendants were
linked or collaborated in an activity which put the plaintiff at their
collective mercy. Faced with this dilemma, the Supreme Court of
California in the landmark decision of Ybarra v. Spangard68 allowed
an exceptional departure from the ordinary rule, requiring the plaintiff to identify the particular person responsible for his injury, and
cast the burden of exoneration on each member of the surgical team
in a case where an unconscious patient undergoing appendectomy had
sustained a dislocation of his shoulder. This exceptional procedure
can be justified, and justified only, by reference to the peculiar responsibility for the patient's welfare undertaken by everyone concerned
66. Cf., Weld-Blundell v. Stephens [1920] A.C. 956 where liability was
denied for republication of a defamatory matter by an unauthorized person.
67. Contrary to American authority, it has been held in England that a
suicide by an accident victim may fall within the risk created by a negligent
tortfeasor, even if the decedent was not insane at the time: Pigney v. Pointers
Transport Services [1957] 1 All E.R. 807; criticised in Fleming, Liability for
Suicide, 31 AusTL. L.J. 587 (1957).
68. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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in consequence of the patient surrendering himself to their control,
and the disparate position of the parties regarding their knowledge of
what in fact occurred to cause the mishap.69 In proper perspective,
the decision may therefore be viewed as a justifiable attempt to
redress the balance which is otherwise too heavily tilted against the
patient as the result of the team's monopoly of information and the
difficulty of inducing one member of the medical profession to volun70
teer evidence against another.
Inevitably, the same problem has also been faced in the Commonwealth. The basal rule of our courts, like the American, is of course
that the evidence must sustain an inference of negligence against a
particular defendant. If it appears merely that either A or B was to
blame, the claim ordinarily fails against both, unless they were joint
tortfeasors, in the strictest sense of being engaged in a common
design,71 or one is for any other reason responsible for the negligence
of both as in cases of vicarious liability. This last qualification, however, is of the utmost importance in the present context, because it
now finds a frequent and increasing illustration in actions against
hospitals since they were burdened with responsibility for all their
professional staff. Accordingly, in all but the statistically negligible
situation where the injured patient has himself selected one or more
members of an operating team, his recovery will no longer be prejudiced by an inability to identify the particular person at fault, as
the hospital will have to answer for all.72
But, even beyond this point, sympathy for plaintiffs has activated
some pressure to relax the normal procedural requirements in their
favour. Thus, in several recent cases, involving head-on automobile
collisions, it has been held legitimate to infer that, in the absence of
an explanation, both drivers were at fault, despite the additional (if
remoter) possibility that only one or the other was to blame.7 3 In
situations such as these, there is of course a strong inference that both
parties were at fault, but this special feature has not deterred the
wider generalization that the same inference is permissible in all
69. See PROSSER, TORTS 208 (2d ed. 1955), 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.7
(1956). The orthodox view is represented in the stringent comment by Seavey,
Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643 (1950).
70. The difficulty of securing expert testimony on behalf of plaintiffs is one
of the most prominent problems encountered in malpractice actions in the
United States. By comparison with the American experience, this problem is
of negligible proportions in England and Australia.
71. See PROSSER, TORTS 234 (2d ed. 1955).
72. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 88; Cassidy v. Ministry of
Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 359.
73. Baker v. Market Harborough Co-operative Society [1953] 1 Weekly L.R.
1472; France v. Parkinson [1954] 1 All E.R. 739 (applied to cross-roads collision). This development has encountered a cool response in Canada, Wotta
v. Haliburton Oil Co. [1955] 2 D.L.R. 785, and has not yet been brought to the
test in Australia.
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cases where the evidence suggests negligence on the part of A or B
or both. For example, in the context of a malpractice action, Denning
L.J., recently observed that
I do not think that the hospital authorities and Dr. Graham can both
avoid giving an explanation by the simple expedient of each throwing the
responsibility on to the other. If an injured person shows that one or the
other or both of two persons injured him, but cannot say which one it
was, then he is not defeated altogether. He can call on each of them for
an explanation.74

But, opposed to this and similar suggestions75 which have not hitherto
formed the basis of any actual holding, there is a substantial catena of
precedent espousing the orthodox view that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable unless the evidence implicates a particular
individual as being either personally or vicariously responsible for
the accident in question.7 6 Resolution of this understandable conflict
of opinion awaits the future.
CONCLUSION
There is little evidence to support the impression, not uncommonly
encountered among American lawyers, that English law is beset with
archaism and characterized by inflexibility. Despite a more stringent
observance of precedent in the Commonwealth, common law techniques offer sufficient elbow room for constant adjustment and change,
This is especially true of those areas of law, like torts, which by
design are equipped with imprecise norms of reference so as to facilitate legal adjudication remaining readily responsive to the contemporary social environment. Any comparison between the British and
American experience in a given legal field reveals a basic similarity,
not only of the issues occupying judicial attention, but, equally, of
the solutions being adopted. This truth clearly emerges from the
preceding review, and should be received with little surprise because,
despite political boundaries, both countries are linked by fundamentally common attitudes to the problems of contemporary life no less
than by the heritage of the common law itself.
74. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 71, 82.
75. Mahon v. Osborne [1939] 2 K.B. 14, 38, per MacKinnon, L.J.
76. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820, MacDonald v.

Pottinger [1953] N.Z.L.R. 196, Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 71.

(McNair J. at trial; an appeal from the decision was allowed on the ground
that the hospital was responsible for the part-time anesthetist, so that the
point now under discussion became academic).

